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Abstract In this paper we consider the buying/selling prices of carbon dioxide (CO2)
emission permits in trading models with uncertainty. Permission prices, although
usually omitted from standard models, may significantly influence the trading mar-
ket. We thus undertook to construct a more realistic trade model and to compare it
with the standard one. To do this, we introduced several important changes to the
standard model, namely, (1) a new optimized quality function; and (2) transactions
with price negotiations between regions. We also enhanced the model using methods
described in the literature to allow it to deal with reported emissions uncertainty.
Additionally, we used an original method of simulating this kind of market based on
a specialized evolutionary algorithm (EA).
1 Introduction
It is claimed that the implementation of a tradable emission permit system can be an
efficient strategy for achieving environmental goals. In permit systems a regulatory
agency distributes emission permits to polluters in accordance with environmental
goals. The permits are transferable among polluters, resulting in—to use simple,
everyday trade model terminology—an equalization of marginal abatement costs
among pollution sources.
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National researchers build market models that optimize their ability to forecast
the emission allowance process and the cost of emission reduction for different coun-
tries (Ermoliev et al. 2000) to stay fully informed about how obligations regarding
greenhouse gas emissions will influence the world economy and about the rules
governing the market. A major challenge is to build a transaction model and to solve
many other problems associated with the credibility and uncertainty of emission level
reports (Ermoliev et al. 1996; Godal 2000; Klaasen et al. 2001; Nahorski et al. 2007).
Earlier proposed models of emission permit trading for CO2 do not really use
transaction prices. Although the models calculate the equilibrium prices, they are
not applied during the trade. The equilibrium permit price is used to calculate the
emission reduction costs only. No negotiation of prices or any additional transaction
costs are applied.
The problem-solving method proposed in earlier papers was original, but diverged
from the real market situation. A more elaborated market model was thus consid-
ered, in which additional elements were included, such as the possibility of choice of
price during negotiation and the influence of real prices on model solutions.
Application of the evolutionary algorithm (EA) method to simulate economic
models is a very fast developing domain, mainly because it is quite easy to model
economic systems using this tool. The evolutionary and agent-based approach to
dynamic market modeling, which can be found in Bonatti et al. (1998), is used
to simulate the very complicated information industry market. The evolutionary
method is a natural way of performing computer simulations of the new model. This
method is presented below.
2 New and earlier market models
The idea of emission permit trading is based on the assumption that some countries
can save emission permits, which they can sell to countries wishing to emit more than
their Kyoto obligations.
Trading is beneficial only when the price of permits is lower than the cost of
emission reduction. Then, the country can reduce emissions below its obligation and
sell the surplus as permits to another country (see Figs. 1 and 2).
Fig. 1 CO2 emission
reduction cost: without trade
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Fig. 2 Without trade, the
emission reduction costs of
CO2 are zero; with trade for




In the base model the total cost of holding emissions in region i down to xi, is
denoted by Ci(xi), which represents the abatement cost function. We assume that
the cost functions Ci(xi) are positive, decreasing, and continuously differentiable for
each region. The Kyoto target for each region i is indicated by Ki. The number of
emission permits acquired, by source, is expressed byyi (yi is negative if region i is a







xi ≤ Ki + yi (2)
n∑
i=1
yi = 0 (3)
where:
E is the minimum cost of decreasing emissions for all countries in the standard
model;
Ci(xi) is the cost of reducing emissions at region i down to xi;
yi is the number of emission permits acquired by region i;
Ki is Kyoto target for region i;
n is the number of regions;
xi is current emissions.
The goal is to minimize the cost of emission reduction in order to cut emissions to
the required level in compliance with the Kyoto target.
This basic model does not deal with the problem of uncertainty in emissions, but
it can be extended to do so, for instance, using ideas described in Nahorski et al.
(2007), Horabik (2005), or Bartoszczuk and Horabik (2007). The only modification
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required to the standard model for considering uncertainty is to replace formula (2)
with formula (4) (Nahorski et al. 2007; Horabik 2005).
xi + (1 − ς) (1 − 2α) dini ≤ Ki + yi (4)
where:
ζ is the parameter that describes the correlation of emissions in the base year
(1990) and the current year, usually ζ ∈ [0.65,0.7];
α is the parameter that describes the risk of noncompliance with the Kyoto target,
α ∈ [0,0.5];
di is the inventory uncertainty for country i;
ni is the base year emission for country i.
The modified model minimizes the sum of total emission reduction costs; however,
the limits imposed are lower than the Kyoto target in order to take into account
possible unreported emissions.
Normally, prices (the shadow price) are defined as the cost derivatives at a given
point. However, in the real world, neither sellers nor buyers are apt to disclose
their emission reduction costs. Moreover, the cost reduction function are usually not
precisely known. Finally, they are not the only component of emission permit prices.
Therefore, in the solution described we assume that a transaction is finalized only
when the permit price that is negotiated is lower than the average cost of emission
reduction for the buyer and higher than the average cost of emission reduction for the
seller. It is obvious that each party wishes to maximize its profit, and this assumption
is the basis for our new quality function.
In the evolutionary approach, which will now be further described, maximization
over y ji and π ji is performed in each transaction by genetic operators (which try
to simulate the price negotiation process to make the transaction more beneficial
and reject any outcomes that are unprofitable), while the total maximization over x ji
is the EA task (selection of better market solutions with lower emission reduction
costs). As mentioned earlier, the model presented contains important changes in
relation to previous models. The most important change is a different goal function
(5) which maximizes the difference between cost with no trade and cost with trade,
where the buying/selling price of the permit is included. It considerably influences
transaction profitability and the decision regarding buying/selling permits, including
the decision, whether it is more advantageous to reduce emissions than to buy
permits. Unfortunately, in a single-criterion version a large part of the information
specific to participating parties is lost after the total sum over i is calculated, but
this information is used by genetic operators and can be stored to research the
market behavior. The goal function (5) is only a single-criterion version of a more
sophisticated model with many criteria: one for each party. A multicriteria model
designed for an agent or multicriteria evolutionary system, has not yet been built;
however, the first steps have been taken toward applying such a system, through
modeling of the Cournot game (Stan´czak 2009).
Formulae (6–11) are constraints which assure that the market model created has
realistic properties:
• A party is not allowed to emit more than its Kyoto obligation plus acquired
permits (6);
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• Additional permits can be bought only from parties participating in the market,
and no extra permits are available (8);
• Buying/selling permits changes the level of allowable emissions of a party (7);
• The number of permits traded in one transaction is limited to ymax to avoid major
fluctuations in permit prices (9);
• The price of the permit in a transaction is identical for the selling and buying
party (10);
• The numbers of traded permits are treated as negative values for the selling
parties and positive for the buying ones, and their absolute values are equal (11).






























y ji = 0 (8)
0 ≤ y ji ≤ ymax (9)
π ji =
{
0 for parties not trading in the transaction j






0 for parties not trading in the transaction j
−y ji for party selling in the transaction j
y ji for party buying in the transaction j
(11)
where:
G is the minimum cost of decreasing emissions for all parties in the model;
T is number of buying/selling transactions conducted;
Ci(x ji) are the costs of reducing emissions by the party i to x ji after j transactions;
Ki is the Kyoto target for the party i;
n is the number of parties;
x ji is the emissions of the party i after j transactions;
y ji is the number of emission permits acquired by the party i;
π ji is the price of permits bought/sold in transaction j by the party i.
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Using function (5) we look for a solution to maximize the difference between the cost
when no trading takes place and the cost when permits are exchanged, in other words,
the profit from emission trading. In the previous goal function we minimized the cost
of emission reduction without including buying prices and expenditures for this goal:
note that the cost of buying can be considerably greater than expenditure on CO2
reduction if there is no trade. In the new approach, we also assume slightly different
methods of permit price setting. The authority or market must set a minimum price
below which the permit price cannot go. This is to exclude cases where countries
reporting emissions below the Kyoto level have zero marginal abatement costs
(compare Fig. 2). Therefore, the marginal cost (e.g., shadow price) is no longer a
derivative of the abatement cost, but a derivative with minimal value. In practical
cases the price negotiations prevent a situation arising where the price of a permit
drops to zero. While no country would wish to “sell” permits at no cost, the model
described should have some kind of protection against such cases.
The second important change is the introduction of transactions. Transactions are
conducted iteratively until there is no further benefit for participants and all parties
have dropped out. Prices and amounts of transferred permits are negotiated. Thus,
unlike the static base model, our market model is dynamic.
The real price of permits and the number of permit is not known before computer
simulation of market activity is conducted and the process of price negotiations
among parties is emulated. As an approach to negotiations, in computer simulations
presented in this paper the number of permits sold is randomly chosen from some
interval. In a similar way the permit price is chosen from the interval between the
maximum price (shadow price) of the buyer and minimum price (modified shadow
price) of the seller.
Similar to the base model, the new formulae (5–10) do not deal with the problem
of the uncertainty of reported emissions; however, this can be changed by intro-
ducing a new formula (12) instead of a formula (6) to consider possible unreported
emissions:




where all symbols have the same meaning as in formulae (4–11).
3 Evolutionary algorithm method in computer simulations
Although the standard evolutionary algorithm works as shown in Table 1, many
problem-specific improvements are needed to make this simple scheme work
efficiently. To adjust the genetic algorithm to the solved problem, there must be: (1)
a proper encoding of solutions; (2) creation of specialized genetic operators for that
problem and an accepted data structure; and (3) a fitness function that is optimized
by the algorithm.
We thus use a specialized evolutionary algorithm to solve the problem: one
individual contains information about all the parties participating in the market,
making it a complete solution to our problem. Another method may also be applied
whereby each party is treated as one independent individual (Alkemade et al. 2006;
Clemens and Riechmann 2006). In the latter case we obtain only one solution, as
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Table 1 The evolutionary algorithm
Random initialization of the population of solutions.
Reproduction and modification of solutions using genetic operators.
Valuation of the solutions obtained.
Selection of individuals for the next generation.
If a stop condition is not satisfied, return to step 2.
the population of solutions in evolutionary algorithm is limited to the number of
parties participating in the trade. The case considered (five parties) is too small for
an evolutionary algorithm to work efficiently, and is therefore not used.
We use the former approach. Thus, the whole individuals’ population contains a
number of solutions, as many as the number of individuals. The solutions need not
be different, although they usually are. Thanks to this parallelism of evolutionary
computations, we usually obtain several scenarios of possible market evolution.
The information needed to describe one party is as follows:
• Theoretical price of own permits (shadow price);
• The real price of current permits sold/bought;
• The value of current permits sold/bought;
• Number of permits currently sold/bought;
• The total sum of permits sold/bought;
• Current emissions;
• Previous emissions (before present transaction);
• Value of present and previous goal function.
To modify the solution, the following genetic operators were used:
• Competition: a chosen party offers a number of permits for sale, some other
parties declare a willingness to buy them, next the best option is chosen, and the
solution (the individual) is modified;
• Sale: the chosen parties conduct transactions.
The prices and numbers of permits traded are randomly chosen. The number of
permits traded is chosen from the interval {1,..,5},1 and the permit price is drawn
from a given distribution as a value between the buying and selling offer, with the
expected value of the distribution being the average of these two values.
In EA a goal function is called fitness function because it is often modified (scaled
or moved) due to EA requirements. Thus the fitness function for EA is a direct goal
function of a problem, as described by formula (5).
Population initializing procedures and genetic operators are designed so as to
obey the constraints (6–12), and forbidden solutions cannot appear in the population
of solutions.
As specialized genetic operators are used, some method of sampling them needs
to be applied in all iterations of the algorithm. In the approach used (Mulawka and
Stan´czak 1999; Stan´czak 2003), it is assumed that an operator that generates good
1The limitation on the maximum amount of permits sold is introduced, as trading too large a number
of permits in one transaction can have a large impact on permit prices and undermine profitability.
One permit is an equivalent of 1MtC.
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Table 2 The data applied for calculations for various regions
Country Initial emission Cost function parameter (a) Limit Kyoto (Ki)
(xi0) MtC/year MUSD/(MtC/year)2 MtC/year
USA 1,820.3 0.2755 1,251
EU 1,038.0 0.9065 860
Japan 350.0 2.4665 258
CANZ 312.7 1.1080 215
FSU 898.6 0.7845 1,314
results should have greater probability and affect the population more frequently.
As every individual may have its own preferences, every individual has a vector
of floating point numbers, beside the encoded solution. Each number corresponds
to one genetic operation. It is a measure of quality of the genetic operator.
The higher the number, the higher the probability of operator execution by the
individual.
This set of probabilities or, in other words, the ranking of qualities is also a basis of
the experience of every individual, and each individual chooses an operator in each
epoch of the algorithm according to it. Through the experience gathered, individuals
can maximize the chances of their offspring surviving.
4 Computer simulation results
Computer simulations were conducted on data set, in line with other authors’ papers,
mainly Bartoszczuk and Horabik (2007), Horabik (2005), and Nahorski et al. (2007).
We consider a group of the following countries: United States (USA); European
Union (EU); Japan; Canada, Australia and New Zealand (CANZ); and former
Soviet Union with Eastern Europe (FSU). We assume that cost depends on emission




a ∗ (xi0 − xi)2 for xi < xi0
0 for xi ≥ xi0 (13)
Table 3 Results in scenario assuming perfect permit market model
Region/ Final Final price Number of Permits Emission
country emission USD/tC imported expenditures reduction cost
MtC/year permits Mt/year MUSD/year MUSD/year
USA 1,561.0 143 310 11,974.3 18,523.7
EU 959.0 143 100 15,790.6 5,515.1
Japan 321.0 143 63 29,987.6 2,074.3
CANZ 248.0 143 33 16,077.6 4,638.2
FSU 808.0 143 −506 −73,830.1 6,439.5
Total – – 0 0 37,190.8
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Table 4 The results of simulation from the new model; uncertainty not considered
Region/ Final Final price Number of Permits Emission
country emission USD/tC imported expenditures reduction cost
MtC/year permits Mt/year MUSD/year MUSD/year
USA 1,562.0 142.3 311 47,486.4 18,381.1
EU 959.0 143.2 99 15,823.3 5,657.5
Japan 321.0 143.1 63 18,521.7 2,074.3
CANZ 248.0 143.4 33 4,010.5 4,638.2
FSU 808.0 142.2 −506 −85,841.9 6,439.5
Total – – 0 0 37,190.6
where:
a cost function parameter;
xi0 initial emission;
xi current emission.
In Table 2 we describe abatement cost function coefficients, which have special
interpretation.
Table 5 Results obtained using the described new model; uncertainty considered with different
values of risk parameter α, see formula (12)
Region Reported Final price Permits Cost of traded Cost of emission
emissions USD/tC traded permits reduction
(MtC/year) (Mt/year) MUSD/year MUSD/year
Risk parameter α = 0.5
USA 1,559.0 144.0 308 44,834.0 18,810.5
EU 970.0 141.4 100 14,393.0 5,515.1
Japan 321.0 143.1 63 17,831.2 2,074.3
CANZ 249.0 141.2 34 4,049.0 4,495.9
FSU 809.0 140.6 −505 −81,107.2 6,298.1
α = 0.3
USA 1,538.0 167.1 287 45,975.4 25,340.5
EU 957.0 167.2 97 17,948.8 7,707.3
Japan 331.0 167.4 63 17,159.6 2,839.9
CANZ 242.0 168.2 27 5,406.2 6,384.3
FSU 840.0 167.5 −474 −86,489.9 8,936.8
α = 0.1
USA 1,514.0 191.9 263 51,350.1 33,414.8
EU 954.0 192.9 94 16,610.9 10,265.5
Japan 321.0 191.7 63 18,810.4 3,725.4
CANZ 237.0 190.8 22 2,737.3 8,216.9
FSU 872.0 192.8 −442 −89,508.7 11,842.5
α = 0.0
USA 1,502.0 204.3 251 51,801.7 37,870.0
EU 954.0 203.1 94 19,372.8 11,375.2
Japan 320.0 208.8 62 16,584.4 4,419.5
CANZ 234.0 203.3 19 1,403.0 9,321.1
FSU 888.0 205.4 −426 −89,161.9 13,448.4
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In a traditional method (perfect market information) we obtain the results pre-
sented in Table 3.
In the case of new model application the results are presented in Table 4.
Application of the EA method to simulate the permits market provides some
additional benefits, as the result is not just a single set of parameters, but a set of
possible scenarios. EA operates on a population of mainly different individuals, and
computations are conducted in a non-deterministic way. In particular, negotiation of
permit prices is modeled as random number generation from a little modified normal
distribution, cut to the desired interval—prices are generated from the interval that is
profitable for both countries, and if there is no such interval, no transaction is made.
Thus, different scenarios depend mainly on negotiated prices (i.e., prices randomly
generated in the simulation).This non-deterministic aspect of EA can be seen if
one compares results presented in Tables 4 and 5 for α = 0.5: this value of risk
parameterα makes the uncertainty component in (12) inactive, but results are not
exactly the same. Thus, two different scenarios of market evolution can be observed.
Such scenarios can be obtained and used as a basis for more sophisticated analyses
of market behavior.
5 Conclusions
In contrast with the previous model (Bartoszczuk and Horabik 2007), our original
permit market model is dynamic. The results show that including perfect permit
prices is more cost-effective than in our dynamic market solution, but this fact
is easy to explain—transactions are conducted at negotiated prices (free market
assumptions), not at optimal prices calculated and imposed by some authority.
The permit distribution is thus slightly different in the second model (column 4 in
Tables 3 and 4), and the structure of buying parties is changed; it is more beneficial
to reduce emissions than to buy permits in the case of the USA (column 6 in
Tables 3 and 4. Obviously, the total cost of emission reduction in the second method
(85,841.9 MUSD/year) is higher than in the first (73,830.1 MUSD/year), which can be
explained by higher expenditure for permits and slightly higher necessary emission
reduction. Results obtained using the new model with different values of risk
parameter α show that in a case with full uncertainty, fewer permits are purchased
and there is a greater reduction of emissions, which is more expensive. Moreover, the
permit prices in the scenario with full uncertainty is 30% higher than in the scenario
with parameter α = 0.5 (no-uncertainty scenario). For all practical purposes we are
able to anticipate that applying the dynamic model requires additional agreements
among parties. While such activities are difficult to implement, our analysis proves
that they are environmentally friendly, as they require emission reductions.
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